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ABSTRACT 
 
The important role of Russia in satisfying European gas demand and the subsequent gas 
disruptions in 2006 and 2009 have scrutinized the role of Russia in developing a Common 
Energy Policy for the EU. Those skeptical of Russian influence have emphasized the threats to 
the internal market and the security of supply in constructing new pipeline infrastructure for the 
trade of gas. This research determines that the perceived threats to the internal market and the 
security of supply are unjustified. In addition, pragmatic economic interests have incentivized 
actors to oppose Nord Stream and South Stream. 
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Introduction 
 
The European Commission published a Green Paper in 2006 proposing to develop a Common 
Energy Policy for the European Union (EU). Since this publication the concept of a Common 
Energy Policy has gained considerable importance on the political agenda. The Green Paper 
defined a Common Energy Policy by the objectives it had to achieve: (1) development of the 
internal market, (2) security of supply and (3) sustainability. This research will use the same 
definition in order to determine the influence of Russia on the development of a Common 
Energy Policy.  
Russian gas accounts for the largest share of gas imports into the EU and is transported 
entirely using pipelines. The important role of Russia in satisfying European gas demand and the 
gas disruptions in 2006 and 2009 have scrutinized the role of Russia in the development of a 
Common Energy Policy for the EU. Subsequent criticism of Russian influence emphasized the 
threats to the internal market and the security of supply by developing new pipeline 
infrastructure. 
To determine the influence of Russia on a Common Energy Policy the initiation of two 
pipeline projects are examined in this research: (1) Nord Stream, that transports Russian gas 
directly to Germany and (2) South Stream, that was meant to transport Russian gas directly to 
Southern Europe. The potential disruptive role of Nord Stream and South Stream should be put 
in the wider perspective of new energy infrastructure that by its very nature stands to benefit one 
actor more than the other 
The research question is: Will increased diversification of the infrastructure for the 
transportation of Russian gas stimulate or hinder the development of a Common Energy Policy? 
The answers to the research question are to be derived from the following sub questions: (1) 
What are the technical aspects of the trade in Russian gas? (2) How are these technical aspects 
organized on a political level? (3) What is the role of energy companies, national interests and 
prices? 
 In order to answer the sub questions this research examines the factors that have a 
significant influence on the development of a Common Energy Policy and cluster them in three 
2 
 
successive categories: (1) technical, (2) governance and (3) internal market. The results of this 
research will determine if the perceived threats to the development of the internal market and 
security of supply are justified.  This research does not determine a final verdict on the merits of 
both projects. Nor will this research determine the merits of a Common Energy Policy. Rather, 
this argumentation provides a rational explanation if both projects will stimulate or prevent the 
development of a Common Energy Policy 
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1. Common Energy Policy 
1.1. Origins 
 
The 1950s witnessed the establishment of two institutional frameworks to regulate cooperation 
between European countries in the field of energy. In 1951 Belgium, France, West Germany, 
Italy, the Netherlands and Luxembourg agreed on the establishment of the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). This organization provided an institutional framework for coal which 
constituted the primary energy source for consumption in the 1950s. In 1957 an institutional 
framework for nuclear energy was established. The European Atomic Energy Community 
(EURATOM)  emerged in a time when nuclear energy was perceived to be the dominant energy 
of the future.  
Regardless of the merits of both organizations the call for a more extensive energy policy 
for Europe was accompanied by the creation of institutions on other global issues. I.e.: the 
creation of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995.
1
 After the fall of the Soviet Union in 
the 1990’s Dutch Prime Minister Ruud Lubbers proposed a European Energy Charter. This 
Energy Charter served to develop closer economic relations with post-communist Eastern 
Europe and to increase the interdependence of countries within Europe.
2
 Moreover, the Energy 
Charter was thought to consolidate the position of Europe as a major importer of energy on the 
global market. A motivation that has proven to be key even more so today than in the 1990’s. 
 A few years prior to the proposal of Lubbers, the European Commission proposed to 
include the policy field of energy in the treaty of the EU.
3
 The European Commission proposed a 
‘Common Energy Policy’ in the Single European Act (SEA). However, when the SEA was 
adopted in 1987 the member states had rejected the inclusion of a chapter on energy policy. 
                                                 
1
 Before 1995 known as the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
2
 Mayer, S. (2008). Path dependence and Commission activism in the evolution of the European Union's external 
energy policy. Journal of International Relations and Development, 11(3), 255. 
3
 Natorski, M., & Surrallés, A. H. (2008). Securitizing moves to nowhere? The framing of the European Union’s 
energy policy. Journal of Contemporary European Research, 4(2), 84. 
4 
 
Renewed interest in the topic of energy security inspired efforts by the European 
Commission to increase competition and efficiency in the European market for energy. 
Liberalization was the mechanism chosen to reform the European energy sector. In practice, 
liberalization was initiated by the European Commission using legislation in the field of energy 
at three different stages. At present these legislative packages are known as the First (1998), 
Second (2003) and Third Energy Package (2007).  
The First Energy Package marks the start of a liberalization process of the energy markets 
in the EU. Two directives concerning common rules of the internal market in electricity and in 
gas provided harmonization in their respective energy market.
4 
The Second Energy Package 
included the unbundling of the infrastructure of gas and electricity from the production utilities. 
A measure that was meant to increase liberalization and competition but which was strongly 
opposed in particular by Germany and France. The package was designed to enable consumers to 
choose their own energy suppliers in an open market. In practice this competitive market proved 
to be only theory. Consequently, the Second Energy Package was not viewed as a success.  
Successively, the EU sought to extend the development of the internal energy market to 
countries on the eastern border. In 2005 the EU signed a treaty with the countries of South 
Eastern Europe to extend the internal market to these countries outside the EU.
5
 The Energy 
Community of South Eastern Europe (ECSEE) was established to implement the accumulated 
legislation on security of supply and energy efficiency. 
The lack of success of the Second Energy Package prompted an inquiry by Directorate 
General for Competition (DG COMP) of the European Commission on the effectiveness of the 
legislation.
6
 The results of this inquiry concluded that the mechanisms to increase competition 
included in the Second Energy Package fell short of the intended goals.  
                                                 
4
 For electricity: Directive 96/92/European Commission concerning common rules of the internal market in 
electricity. For gas: Directive 98/30/European Commission concerning common rules of the internal market in 
natural gas. 
5
 Umbach, F. (2010). Global energy security and the implications for the EU. Energy Policy, 38(3), 1237. 
6
 The Commission is divided into several departments. The departments are known as Directorates-General (DGs) 
who focus on a specific policy field (i.e.: competition, energy or trade). 
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On January 1, 2006 the Russian energy company Gazprom limited the supply of gas to 
Ukraine following disputes on the price and storage of gas which resulted in energy shortages for 
member states that were dependent on the transit of gas through Ukraine. 
Two months later in 2006 the European Commission proposed a Green Paper titled ‘A 
European strategy for sustainable, competitive and secure energy’. The Green Paper was an 
important step in the development of a common European energy policy. The concept of a 
Common Energy Policy was defined by the European Commission through the three objectives 
it was set out to achieve: (1) sustainability, by promoting renewable energy and energy 
efficiency; (2) competitiveness, by improving the interconnectivity of the European energy 
infrastructure and successively developing an internal market for energy; and (3) security of 
supply, by coordinating European supply and demand in the global market. The fact that the 
objectives were formulated in a general form helped rally the support for the concept of a 
common energy policy. These objectives could be interpreted in different ways because the 
actors that referenced to them had different priorities. I.e. the security of supply of Russian gas 
was interpreted differently by politicians in Poland than for business executives in Germany. 
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1.2. Third Energy Package 
 
In order to propel the development of the internal market as being one of the objectives of a 
Common Energy Policy the European Commission proposed a Third Energy Package in 2007 
which addressed the inefficiencies that were examined in the implementation of the Second 
Energy Package.  
In 2006 coinciding with the proposal for a Third Energy Package and the Russia-Ukraine 
gas dispute the topic of energy security gained prominence on the political agenda. The fear 
arose that energy would be used as a political instrument. This fear was mainly present in the 
new member states in the Baltic countries of Eastern Europe. Thus Poland, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania lobbied hard to raise awareness for the issue of energy dependence as they perceived 
themselves being vulnerable to supply disruptions from Russia. A Common Energy Policy 
would integrate them in the European energy grid and limit their dependency on Russia.  
Integration of these countries proved challenging because gas infrastructure is not always 
profitable in Europe. In other words, forces of liberalization have limited incentive in an open 
market for investing in this infrastructure. However, the European Parliament emphasized that 
the EU should help finance these infrastructural projects without an attractive payback in an 
effort to promote the development of the internal market and to increase the security of supply. 
In 2007 the 27 member states of the European Council emphasized the  importance of 
developing a Common Energy Policy.
7
 A single, competitive gas and electricity market 
comprised the first developmental stages in doing so.
8
 The Lisbon Treaty was signed in 
December 2007 and included the most extensive article on energy and the distribution of 
competences thus far.
9
 For primary law to include a chapter on energy emphasized the growing 
                                                 
7
 Noël, P. (2009). A Market between us: reducing the political cost of Europe’s dependence on Russian gas. 
Electricity Policy Research Group Working Paper, 916. University of Cambridge, 22; Noel refers to this document 
to support this claim: Council of the European Union, “Brussels European Council 8/9 March 2007. Presidency 
Conclusions”, 7224/1/07; REV 1, CONCL 1, 2 May 2007, 16. 
8
 Umbach, F. (2010). Global energy security, 1234. 
9
 TFEU Art. 194; Braun, J.F. (2011) ‘EU Energy Policy under the Treaty of Lisbon Rules: Between a New Policy 
and Business as Usual’. Common Energy Policy S/EPIN Working Paper 31, 2. 
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importance of this subject. The treaty transposed the objectives of the Green Paper into aims for 
a European energy policy: (1) ensure the functioning of the internal market for energy, (2) ensure 
security of energy supply in the Union, (3) promote energy efficiency and sustainability; and (4) 
promote the interconnection of energy networks.
10
 The second paragraph emphasizes how these 
four aims will not affect the right of member states to determine on a national level: (1) 
conditions for exploiting its energy resources, (2) its choice between different energy sources; 
and (3) the general structure of its energy supply.
11
 In practice this implies that national 
governments and political bodies of the EU have shared competences in the policy area of the 
internal market for energy. However, the second paragraph which emphasizes the exempted 
national competences concerns factors of external energy policy.  
In April 2009 Dmitry Medvedev, as President of Russia, sent a letter to the European 
Commission in which he proposed non-discriminatory access to energy markets as an alternative 
to the Energy Charter. The proposal was formally ignored and three months later the European 
Parliament and the European Council adopted the Third Energy Package that was proposed by 
the European Commission.  
 The Third Energy Package included the most significant reforms of all three packages 
and consequently the most controversial.
12
 Reforms consisted of ownership unbundling to 
separate the infrastructure for the transportation of gas from the production utilities. In other 
words, gas pipelines could no longer be the property of the same company that supplied or sold 
the gas. This would enable the achievement of the objective of the creation of an internal market. 
Ownership unbundling proved to be a controversial proposal because it affected the traditional 
structure of a market where national energy companies often enjoyed a natural monopoly. 
Moreover, the Third Energy Package established a new institutional framework to coordinate the 
national regulatory authorities (NRA’s). Another reform was concerned with both the internal 
market and security of supply by (3) establishing of a European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Gas (ENTSOG). ENTSOG was to be responsible for the development of 
                                                 
10
 TFEU Art. 194 (1). 
11
 TFEU Art. 194 (2). 
12
 The Third Energy Package included two Directives and three Regulations: Directive 2009/72/EC; Directive 
2009/73/EC; Regulation (EC) No 714/2009; Regulation (EC) No 715/2009; Regulation (EC) No 713/2009. 
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the cross-border infrastructure of the internal market for gas but also conducted the first stress 
test in 2014 to determine the vulnerability of member states as a result of future gas disruptions. 
Efforts to expand this supranational oversight followed the adaptation of the Third 
Energy Package. Günter Oettinger, as Commissioner for Energy, became the voice of shifting 
competences in the field of energy towards the European Commission. The proposal of former 
Polish Prime Minister and current President of the European Council Donald Tusk to involve the 
European Commission in all bilateral deals was given the first priority by Oettinger. However, he 
noted disappointedly that this proposal would not comply with rules set out by the WTO and 
those in the Lisbon Treaty.
13
 Furthermore, he urged member states to implement the legislation 
set out in the Third Energy Package by equating these efforts with challenges set out by the 
Green Paper: security of supply, increased competition and sustainability.
14
 In order to 
substantiate the importance of these goals emphasis was placed on the principle of solidarity set 
out in the Lisbon Treaty.
15
 Referring to the Lisbon Treaty to create legitimacy for his ambitions. 
This culminated in 2012 when the European Commission established an information exchange 
mechanism to increase transparency on the bilateral deals of member states with third parties 
outside the EU. 
 The Third Energy Package consists of two Directives and three Regulations that are 
primarily concerned with the creation of the internal market. The development of the internal 
market is also one of the objectives of a Common Energy Policy. However, the other three 
objectives of a Common Energy Policy: security of supply, sustainability and international 
representation are often pursued by coupling them to the objective of the internal market. Efforts 
to achieve the creation of the internal market were unavoidably influencing the existing market 
situation and thus likely to be considered controversial by a share of the existing market actors. 
Consequently, it would be unreasonable to conclude that the actors that promoted the 
                                                 
13
 Oliver, C., (2014, July 9). EU energy market: Pipe dream. Financial Times; Dixon, H. (2014, September 7). A 
Stress Test for E.U. Energy Supplies. New York Times. 
14
 European Commission (2010). Benchmarking Report: correct implementation of EU energy law and 
infrastructure investment top priority. Press Release.  
15
 Neuman, M. (2010). EU–Russian Energy Relations after the 2004/2007 EU Enlargement: An EU Perspective. 
Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 18(3), 348. 
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development of a Common Energy Policy all pursuit the same objective. Even when supporting 
a European approach on energy the interpretation of the objectives varies and actors are able to 
use the objective for the internal market to promote their interests in the other objectives of 
security of supply or sustainability. 
This research uses the same definition as the Green Paper of 2006 in which a Common 
Energy Policy was defined by the objectives it is meant to achieve: (1) a functioning internal 
market, (2) security of supply, (3) sustainability, and (4) the ability of the EU and the member 
states to speak with a single voice on external energy matters.   
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2. Technical 
 
This chapter examines the technical aspects of the pipeline infrastructure for the transportation of 
gas in the wider context of energy commodities. These aspects are divided in three successive 
categories: (1) availability, (2) infrastructure and (3) consumption. This format provides the 
opportunity to evaluate the current status quo of energy in Europe. In particular the role of the 
pipeline infrastructure for the transport of Russian gas to the EU. 
 
2.1. Availability 
2.1.1. World  
 
Gas takes on a specific role in any energy policy due to the nature of this commodity. Thus the 
value chain, which includes all the elements that compromise the process from the production to 
the consumption of a commodity, is different for gas in comparison to other types of fuel that are 
used to produce energy. 
The properties of gas are translated into a wide variety in the modes of transport. Gas is 
often more expensive to transport over long distances than other energy commodities. Because of 
the physical properties of gas the value chain for the trade of gas is characterized by: long 
distance, but limited to a few thousand kilometers; a changing demand pattern for seasons and 
daytime; and volume risk, the pipelines need certain pressure to be able to operate. While oil is 
traded on a global scale using different modes of transport, natural gas was historically traded on 
a regional scale. Consequently the trade in natural gas was and is limited in scope. 
Transportation of gas from a producer to a consumer was done using pipelines which invoke 
bilateral deals between the supply and demand sides.
16
 I.e. long term investments and volume 
risks that lead to the need for security of demand and security of supply between two or more 
actors. The costs of transporting gas over longer distances explains why significant regional 
                                                 
16
 Johnson, C., & Derrick, M. (2012). A Splintered Heartland: Russia, Europe, and the Geopolitics of Networked 
Energy Infrastructure. Geopolitics, 17(3), 483. 
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Figure 1. Consumption by fuel. Source: BP (2014) Statistical Review 
differences in the prices of gas remain even if the trade of gas has expanded beyond the region 
from which it originated. In comparison to gas it is less expensive to trade oil on a global scale 
which increases global competition and reduces price differences within the market.  
In the past decade the transportation of natural gas using ships has become more 
accustomed but what is needed for natural gas to be transported using ships is to process the 
commodity in liquid form. Liquefied natural gas (LNG) requires significant technical know-how 
and facilities that are not available to all countries and companies. The physical requirements for 
processing and transport make it challenging for LNG to compete with pipeline gas.
17
 However, 
in the past decade technological developments have decreased the costs of LNG, combined with 
volatile oil prices this expanded the share of LNG in the market.  
 
2.1.2. EU28 
 
In 2013 the EU imported 53 % of the total 
energy it consumed. For natural gas the 
share of imports (66%) in total consumption 
was even higher.
18
 This high share of 
imports remained in spite of a consistent 
decrease in the demand for gas which can be 
partially attributed to the decrease in 
domestic production. This high share of 
imports in total energy consumption makes 
the EU the largest importer of natural gas in 
the world. 
                                                 
17
 Schmidt-Felzmann, A. (2011a). EU Member States, 576. 
18
 BP (2014). Statistical Year Review: History and 2014; European Commission (2014). European Energy Security 
Strategy. COM(2014) 330 final; The EU has a high share of imports in the consumption of other fuels as well: oil 
(90%), solid fuels (42%) and nuclear fuel (40%). 
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Gas imported into the EU originated from Russia (32%), Norway (31.3%), Algeria 
(13.5%), Qatar (8.4%), Nigeria (3.6%) and Libya (1.9%).
19
 In addition to being the largest 
supplier of gas, Russia is home to the largest proven reserves in the world.
20
 The logic of this 
reasoning is amplified by the fact that proven reserves are only those deposits of natural gas that 
can be recovered under current economic and technical conditions. Thus changes in the price of 
other energy commodities influences these conditions and changes the amount of proven 
reserves available. Nevertheless figure 2 reveals that Russia has seen its share of the European 
market decline over the past decade while the market share of Qatar, which consists entirely of 
LNG, increased. 
 
Figure 2. Origin of natural gas imports for the EU28. Source: Eurostat (2014) 
 
 
                                                 
19
 Eurostat (online data codes: nrg_122a, nrg_123a and nrg_124a). 
20
 “Proved reserves of natural gas – Generally taken to be those quantities that geological and engineering 
information indicates with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing 
economic and operating conditions.” – BP (2014). Statistical Year Review, 20. 
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2.2. Infrastructure 
 
The infrastructure for the transportation of natural gas is a vital part of the development of the 
internal market. A lack of infrastructure hinders the development of a Common Energy Policy of 
which the internal market is the primary objective. To determine the influence of the 
infrastructure for the transportation of Russian gas in the development of a Common Energy 
Policy this chapter will evaluate first the existing infrastructure and second the infrastructure that 
is lacking. 
The previous chapter explained that the trade of gas is limited by geographic proximity. 
Storage of natural gas, more often than not, is unfeasible from economic and technological 
Figure 3. Major trade movements of natural gas using pipelines and LNG in 2013. Source: BP (2014). Statistical Year Review, 29. 
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viewpoint.
21
 Moreover, the availability of LNG-terminals is limited to coastal member states in 
the EU. The technical and financial properties of LNG has ensured the concentration of the 
largest capacity for processing LNG imports in the United Kingdom and in Spain. 
 
2.2.1. Pipelines  
 
The entire transport of gas from Russia to the EU flows through pipelines. Russia also exports 
LNG from the Sakhalin II terminal which is located in the easternmost part of the Eurasian 
continent but the gas is not exported to the EU. Figure 4 illustrates a simplified representation of 
the most important pipelines from geographical north to south: Nord Stream, with OPAL and 
NEL as the onshore extensions; Yamal; Soyuz
22
; South Stream, and; Blue Stream. 
The construction of Nord Stream finished in 2012. The project provides a direct 
connection between Russia and Germany through the Baltic Sea with a maximum capacity of 55 
bcm.  
The construction of Yamal started in 1992. The pipeline infrastructure was constructed 
from Russia through Belarus to Poland and Germany with a maximum capacity of 33 bcm. In 
1997 the first gas was transported through the Yamal pipeline from Western Siberia.   
Soyuz was constructed in the 1960s and increased capacity in the following decades. In 
2014 the gas pipelines through Ukraine had a maximum capacity of 190 bcm. The gas that 
transited through Ukraine was destined for Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, former Yugoslavia, 
Greece and Turkey but most importantly Germany and Italy.  
Figure 5 and 6 illustrate the proposed route for South Stream prior to the cancellation of 
the project in 2014. The intention was to construct the project from Russia through the Black Sea 
to Bulgaria and extended onshore to Serbia, Slovenia, Hungary and Austria with a maximum 
capacity of 63 bcm.  
                                                 
21
 Schmidt-Felzmann, A. (2011a). EU Member States, 576. 
22
 The term ‘Soyuz’ will be used in this research to define all the pipelines that transit through Ukraine. Two of 
which are most notable: Soyuz and Brotherhood. 
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Figure 4. The main Russian gas pipelines to Europe. Source: Samuel Bailey (licensed by Creative Commons) via Wikimedia Commons.23 
 
Despite increased tensions and the revived gas disputes between Russia and Ukraine, 
Soyuz still performs an essential role in the transport of gas to the EU. South Stream was 
                                                 
23
 This illustration is a simplified representation of the most important pipelines. 
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intended to increase the security of supply by diverting the transport of Russian gas away from 
Ukraine. Construction of South Streams fourth pipeline was intended to finish in 2020 and would 
have rendered all gas pipelines through Ukraine superfluous when only the capacity would have 
been taken into consideration.
24
 However, in December 2014 Russian President Vladimir Putin 
reported that the development and construction of South Stream would be cancelled by stating 
that the project would not be feasible when the EU continued to obstruct the project by applying 
legislation from the Third Energy Package which would demand Gazprom to share the capacity 
of South Stream with a third party. The cancellation of South Stream coincided with sanctions 
against Russia and with a significant decrease in the price of oil on the global market. Both 
aspects have led the Russian economy in a downfall which could have provided compelling 
reasons to cancel the expensive project. In the years prior to 2014 the European Commission 
increased pressure on participating countries in the project, including Russia, to apply to the 
requirements of the Third Energy Package to South Stream. While the European Commission 
had the ability to exempt South Stream from these requirements the probability of the European 
Commission doing so was diminished by deteriorating relations during the tensions in Ukraine in 
2013 and 2014. Even prior to the escalation of tensions the overall tendency in the EU was to 
diversify the supply of gas away from Russian due to the interruptions in 2006 and 2009. 
Nabucco was  the practical application of this tendency towards diversification. The EU 
backed this alternative non-Russian pipeline with the intention of diversifying the sources of gas 
away from Russia. Nabucco was intended to transport gas from Central Asia to the EU. In 
reaction, Gazprom tried to participate in the construction of Nabucco. When this effort failed 
Russia proposed the development of South Stream following the same onshore route.
25
 However, 
Nabucco was considered a failure even before the cancellation of South Stream in 2014 because 
the project did not find enough suppliers whilst South Stream had already started construction. 
However, the cancellation of South Stream has increased chances that the interest for Nabucco 
will be renewed.  
                                                 
24
 Pirani, S., Henderson, J., Honoré, A., Rogers, H., & Yafimava, K. (2014). What the Ukraine crisis means for gas 
markets. Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (OIES), 13. 
25
 Smith Stegen, K. (2011). Deconstructing the “energy weapon”: Russia's threat to Europe as case study. Energy 
Policy, 39(10), 6508. 
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Figure 5. Nabucco and South Stream. Source: Samuel Bailey (licensed by Creative Commons) via Wikimedia Commons. 
 
The Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and its extension dubbed the Trans-Adriatic 
pipeline (TAP) are the most viable alternatives for the EU to develop the Southern Corridor after 
the failure of both Nabucco and South Stream. The pipeline is a cooperation between Turkey and 
Azerbaijan with the capacity of 16 bcm of which 10 bcm would be transported to the EU. While 
announcing the cancellation of South Stream Putin also proposed plans for a Russian pipeline to 
Turkey with a capacity of 63 bcm but detailed plans for this initiative are not made public. 
 
2.2.2. LNG 
 
Most of the capacity to import LNG into the EU is concentrated around the coastal countries of 
Western-Europe: the United Kingdom (9.3 bcm), Spain (14.9 bcm), France (8.7 bcm), Belgium 
(3.2 bcm) and Italy (5.5 bcm). Eastern Europe has limited LNG terminals to import gas overseas. 
Lithuania has finished the construction of a LNG-terminal and a multitude of terminals are being 
developed along the coast of the Baltic countries and Southern Europe. In spite of not 
transporting LNG to the EU Russia is still able to influence the construction of LNG terminals in 
the EU. The increasing popularity of LNG was curbed in 2011 by renewed negotiations with 
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Gazprom on gas prices for Western Europe. Gazprom decided to lower the price of gas and 
thereby decreasing the demand for non-Russian LNG. Subsequently, LNG terminals already in 
use are using but a fraction of their capacity thereby increasing the investment risks for new 
terminals in Eastern Europe. This is hindering for the security of supply and the internal market 
in Eastern Europe since LNG may provide an alternative or competition to Gazprom when gas 
prices increase.
26
 The sudden drop in the price of LNG was remarkable considering the 
increasing demand for LNG in Japan following the Fukushima disaster. However, the demand in 
North America dwindled as a result of increased domestic production of shale and oil. Following 
the oil crisis in the 1970s the USA banned the export of these commodities. The increased 
production and the ban on export rendered cheap domestic production for consumers while 
demand for LNG declined. Consequently, lowering the price of LNG on the world market and 
enabling it to compete with Russian gas in Western Europe.  
 
2.2.3. Interconnectors 
 
The infrastructure of pipelines in Europe is shaped following bilateral relations between 
producers and consumers.
27
 This provides challenges for developing an internal market and 
increasing the security of supply. The required infrastructure to reach both objectives is lacking 
in some places and distributed unequally throughout the continent. 
 Interconnectors and pipelines are constructed and planned to enable a more efficient 
functioning of the internal market.
28
 In other words, without additional interconnectors gas 
cannot flow from those in possession to potential traders and consumers elsewhere in the EU. 
The cross-border transmission is also costly which divided national markets in the past. This is 
illustrated by the fact that between 2007, when the Third Energy Package was ratified, and 2010 
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the increase of cross-border flows of electricity is negligible.
29
 Moreover, the lack of 
infrastructure prevents vulnerable member states from importing the gas from other sources and 
thus hindering both the internal market and the security of supply. 
 As a consequence, some member states in the Baltic and in South Eastern Europe are not 
connected to gas networks in the rest of the EU.
30
 Thus, energy islands are created which 
segment the European energy market. Concerning disruptions from Russia, the lack of 
infrastructure also prevents these regions from importing LNG because the necessary facilities 
are located in coastal countries west of the vulnerable countries in CEE.
31
  
 The development and construction of some of these interconnectors is not profitable for 
actors in a liberalized market. The markets concerned are small in comparison with the costs and 
risks involved. The question arises in the public debate if the EU should finance these 
infrastructural endeavors that are vital but not profitable.
32
 Investments of the EU could reinforce 
the mechanisms of the free market that are pursued through the installation of additional 
interconnectors and pipelines. Energy companies are reluctant to finance the necessary 
infrastructure as long as the legislation for a single market is not implemented.
33
 The EU has 
chosen to subsidize or completely finance interconnectors in some areas since the adaptation of 
the Third Energy Package. This operation is costly and at least 17 billion euros is needed to 
complete it.
34
 Moreover, the European Commission has obliged operators to construct reverse-
flow capabilities.
35
  In 2009 25% of all interconnectors had the capability to reverse the transport 
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of gas. The construction of interconnectors has peaked in 2014 with 40 percent of all cross-
border interconnectors in the EU having the capability to reverse the flow of gas.
36
 The new 
interconnectors enabled the transport of gas from Germany to Poland, from Greece to Bulgaria 
and from Hungary to Romania thus enabling the bi-directional flow of gas in contrast to the 
conventional flow of gas from east to west. 
Interconnectors in Central and South Eastern Europe will be able to transport gas from 
west to east and from north to south.
37
 Subsequently, it is no longer impossible to resell Russian 
gas within Europe where contractual obligation allow for it.
38
 The implications of these changes 
was illustrated in 2012 when Ukraine received gas from Poland, Hungary and Slovakia. Russia 
expressed vocal and physical opposition to actors that resell their gas in the European market and 
has been partially successful in limiting these efforts. I.e.: in 2014 Russia reduced the flow of gas 
to Poland and Hungary which rendered them unable to continue trading gas with Ukraine.
39
 It is 
important to emphasize that the liquidity of trading gas in CEE is still considerably low 
compared to Western Europe. The liquidity of gas is often measured by the churn rate which is 
defined as the number of times gas is traded before being delivered. In Western Europe the churn 
rate is three times higher than for the beneficiaries of gas that is transported through Ukraine: 
Italy, Austria and the countries in South Eastern Europe.
40
 However, the rapid construction of 
interconnectors and reselling of gas to Ukraine will improve future liquidity in CEE.  
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2.2.4. Nord Stream 
 
Increased integration and connectivity of the European energy grid is hindered by a lack of 
interconnectors. Subsequently blocking the development of the internal market. This status quo 
has strong historical and technical causes. Natural gas has been transported for decades from 
geographical east to west because Russia, or the former Soviet Union, is neighboring the EU and 
home to the largest proven reserves in the world.
41
  
Cooperation with Russia in the construction of infrastructure for the transport of gas did not 
hinder the construction of the interconnectors. The capacity of Nord Stream and the construction 
of LNG terminals has stimulated integration of the internal market. Firstly, this stimulation was 
provided indirectly and presumably without purpose: in reaction to the gas dispute of 2009 the 
construction and development of interconnectors increased following regulations adopted by the 
European Parliament and the Council that would prioritize them. Secondly, the construction of 
Nord Stream did not consolidate the lack of infrastructure by circumventing Poland and the 
Baltic States and delivering gas directly to Germany. Rather, the EU is prioritized the 
construction of pipelines from Germany to Poland and, in their turn, from Poland to the Baltic 
States. The construction of additional interconnectors and upgrading existing interconnectors 
with reverse-flow capabilities provides Eastern Europe with alternative sources of gas such as 
LNG from Western Europe while continuing the flow of Russian gas to Western Europe.
42
 These 
interconnectors have improved the competition and security of supply for the internal market. 
The construction of Nord Stream and additional interconnectors provided the opportunity to 
change the traditional flow route of gas. I.e. the transportation of gas originating from Nord 
Stream has been transported through the Gazella pipeline to the Czech Republic.
43
 Likewise, gas 
was transported from the EU to Ukraine. South Stream would have penetrated the European 
market from a new entry point. This would have increased the security of supply and diversified 
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the infrastructure for the transport of Russian gas away from Ukraine, thereby reducing the 
impact of supply interruptions while increasing competition within the EU. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
2.3. Consumption 
 
This section determines if the development of Russian pipeline infrastructure for the transport of 
gas increased the dependency on Russia and if this infrastructure will hindered the diversification 
of both the sources and the types of fuel. In order to answer this question this section is divided 
in three successive categories: (1) energy mix, what is the share and consumption of gas for each 
member state; (2) dependency, where does this gas come from and what is the share of Russian 
gas in the energy mix; and (3) diversification, what is the influence of alternative fuels and 
alternative infrastructure for the transportation of Russian gas. 
 
2.3.1. Energy Mix 
 
The energy mix consists of all types of energy that a Member State consumes to meet demand. 
Figure 6 categorizes these commodities as: gas, oil, coal, nuclear energy, hydroelectric and 
renewables while exposing significant differences in the energy mix of the member states of the 
EU. 
 
Figure 6. Consumption by fuel in EU member states. Source: BP (2014) Statistical Year Review. 
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2.3.2. Dependency 
 
The import dependency on gas is determined by the share of gas that is not produced 
domestically in the EU as a whole. The import dependency increased since 2001 in all the 
member states except for Bulgaria, which already relied for 100 percent on imports, and in the 
Czech Republic.
44
 Within the EU there are significant differences because half of all member 
states have an import dependency of 90 percent or above. Algeria, Norway, Qatar and Russia 
compromise the main suppliers of these imports. Some countries import their natural gas from 
multiple suppliers whilst other countries import their gas from one supplier, i.e. Russia.  
 
Figure 7. Share of gas in energy consumption. Source: European Commission (2014) European Economy – Member State’s Energy Dependence. 
 
To determine what the dependency on gas is for each member state we successively have 
to review if the gas originated from participating countries in the European Economic Area 
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(EEA) or non-EEA countries.
45
 Figure 7 illustrates the prominence of gas in the energy mix and 
the share that is imported from non-EEA countries. 
Gas trade with Russia created the most important import dependence and is also the most 
controversial because of the gas disruptions in 2006 and 2009. The geographic proximity to 
Russia is an overall indicator for the dependency on Russian gas. 
 
Figure 8. Trade movements by pipeline. The legend presents producing countries. Source: BP (2014) Statistical Year Review. 
 
Inclusion in the former Soviet Union has shaped the energy mix and the import 
dependency of the member states in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.
46
 This historic dependency 
and geographic proximity to Russia entails that gas compromises a significant share in their 
national energy mix. In detail this appears to be true for some member states such as Latvia, 
Lithuania and Hungary where the share of gas in the primary energy consumption is above the 
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EU average. However, countries such as Estonia and Bulgaria testify to the opposite.
47
 Some 
academics tend to emphasize the significant growth of natural gas in the energy mix of the EU.
48
 
However, the picture is more nuanced for the past decade where half of all member states 
increased their share of natural gas whilst the other half has seen a decrease in the use of natural 
gas.
49
 Further caution should be observed when acknowledging the high dependency of some 
member states. In popular argumentation emphasize is often put on the fact that multiple 
countries in Eastern Europe are dependent on Russia for 100 percent of their gas demand. 
Complete dependency cannot be overstated but it is necessary to examine this dependency in a 
wider perspective. Bulgaria is often used as the prime example of a high degree of dependency 
on Russia. However, natural gas makes up only 13 percent of Bulgaria’s energy mix. A figure 
that is well below the EU average of 24 percent. The argument that gas is often used for 
generating electricity does not apply here. Only 5 percent of electricity in Bulgaria is generated 
using natural gas compared to a 23 percent average in the EU.
50
 
 The last decade a multitude of initiatives were proposed for the construction of new 
pipeline infrastructure for the transport of Russian gas. However, Nord Stream and South Stream 
were labeled the most controversial and the projects received extensive criticism in the academic 
and public debate. The main argument used by critics was that both projects would increase the 
high dependency on Russian gas.
51
 However, this will prove deceptive when we consider the 
statistics on the importation of gas from non-EEA countries.
52
 Starting in 2008 data on the 
volumes and share of non-EEA gas did not support claims of an increasing dependency on 
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Russia.
53
 Moreover, the data did not support claims of increasing dependency on gas from all the 
non-EEA countries combined. Between 2008 and 2012 the EU has reduced both the volume of 
imports and the share of imports from Russia.
54
 It should be noted that following price cuts in 
2012 due to the renegotiation with Western Europe the share of imports from Russia has 
increased again in 2013. This increase in demand for Russian gas was temporary when both 
consumption (-20%) and import of gas (9%) decreased again in 2014 compared to 2013.
55
 
 The declining dependency on imports is set to change because of a significant decrease (-
40%) in the expected domestic production of natural gas.
 56
 The decline of domestic production 
in Norway, the Netherlands and the UK will not be replaced with alternative production of gas 
before 2020. More likely it will be replaced by the continuing increase in the share of renewable 
energy and the importation of LNG overseas. 
This study will argue that the a potential increase in import dependence will not be 
incurred by Russia. Dependency on Russian gas is high but it is decreasing and is likely to 
continue to do so in the future even if more gas would be imported from outside the EU. There 
are three important reasons for arguing this: (1) dependency decreases due to increased energy 
efficiency; (2) the perception of Russia is increasingly negative which leads member states to 
look for alternatives to Russian gas whilst the conception of the EU in Russia is also 
deteriorating which leads to a shift of focus of Russia towards markets in Asia and; (3) the 
changing market structure for the trade of natural gas in the EU.
57
 
Research by the European Commission, the International Energy Agency and the Oxford 
Institute for Energy Studies acknowledges that energy efficiency is the main factor for 
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decreasing demand in natural gas and will continue to be so in the next two decades.
58
 While 
these gains are generally made in Western Europe the potential of increased energy efficiency in 
Eastern Europe is far greater. In CEE countries the energy intensity is 2.5 times the average in 
the EU.
59
 Union-wide environmental goals and technological development will safeguard a 
growing energy efficiency in CEE countries and this will have a considerable effect on the 
energy demand in the EU.  
 
2.3.3. Diversification 
 
Continuing from the previous arguments Nord Stream and South Stream would diversify the 
infrastructure for the transportation of gas but they would not diversify the sources of natural gas 
since both projects will transport Russian gas only. Moreover, South Stream would have 
prevented the development of alternative pipelines that would be able to divert the importation of 
gas away from Russia. The most viable rival to South Stream that would be able to do so was 
Nabucco. Nabucco was backed by both the USA and the EU but it did not receive the support of 
the largest member states such as Germany, France and Italy. The main reason for the failure of 
Nabucco was the lack of suppliers. Whilst the development of pipelines often starts upstream 
with the producers, the development of Nabucco was initiated downstream by European energy 
companies. Russia influenced the failure of Nabucco to some extent by consolidating its ties with 
potential suppliers in Central Asia.
60
 Simultaneously with the development of Nabucco Russia 
increased the import of gas from Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to subsequently 
resell the gas to the EU. Russia was able to convince these countries to do so by offering gas 
prices on par with gas prices in the EU. If this research would interpret the assertive policy of 
Russia as being more of a political than an economic move, as opponents of South Stream 
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suggest, it would also entail that Nabucco would not have found enough suppliers even without 
the construction of South Stream because Russia would still have bought the gas as it did. 
Considering that the development of a pipeline without the corresponding gas to operate it would 
be undesirable.  
 Apart from these arguments, Nabucco is not essential to the development of a Common 
Energy Policy. Since 2006 the diversification of gas imports to the EU has increased and the 
import from non-EEA countries has reduced from 62 percent in 2006 to 60 percent in 2010 and 
55 percent in 2012.
61
 This development illustrated a surprising turning point considering that 
Nord Stream was developed and operated during the same period. Finally, Nord Stream and 
South Stream would not increase the dependency on Russian gas because they would not 
increase the total volume of gas imported from Russia but they would diversify the pipeline 
infrastructure through which the gas is exported to the EU.  This is not only due to declining 
demand in the EU but also due to lack of production capacity on the Russian side. Goldthau has 
noted that it is highly questionable if Russia would be able to increase production even if 
European demand would require it to do so.
62
  This is attributed mainly to the depletion of 
existing gas fields and a lack of investments in technology to recover the proven reserves from 
new gas fields. Furthermore, Russia is not buying the gas from Central Asia with the sole reason 
to hinder the development of Nabucco but it needs to do so because the gas enables Gazprom to 
meet Russian domestic demand. The sources of gas in Central Asia already constituted 8 percent 
of the total exports of Gazprom to the EU in 2006.
63
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3. Governance 
 
This chapter determines how technical aspects influence the governmental perspective of the 
value chain of natural gas. Three successive categories will be used to determine this influence: 
(1) institutional framework, what is the best institutional level to develop a Common Energy 
Policy; (2) legislative competences, covers the institutional level on which legislative 
competences are situated and how these competences shift between vertical levels of 
governance; (3) security of supply, how the objective of energy security is interpreted as an 
argument for policy choices by different actors and applied to Russia in particular. The three 
categories are based on political aspects that have hindered the development of a Common 
Energy Policy thus far: (1) a lacking supranational institutional framework for the development 
of a Common Energy Policy; (2) a lack of legislative competences limits the capacity of the 
European Commission to develop a Common Energy Policy, and; (3) the objective of security of 
supply is interpreted differently throughout by actors and is used by them to substantiate 
different priorities. 
 
3.1. Institutional framework 
 
3.1.1. Institutional level 
 
The distribution of competences in the EU can best be summarized as a struggle between two 
opposite viewpoints. Reviewing this comparison is important because it reveals the position of 
actors in the debate. On one side, the proponents of the development of a Common Energy 
Policy on a supranational level. This level of governance would then oblige individual member 
states and their respective governments to oblige by legislation adopted by EU institutions. This 
side consists of certain DG’s of the European Commission; lobbying firms operating on Union 
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level, and; member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE).
64
 One of the most notable actors 
on this side is current President of the European Council Donald Tusk. The other side, the 
proponents of intergovernmentalism consist of: member states defending their national 
competences and national energy companies who want to protect their monopoly using 
intergovernmental cooperation. They promote the development of a Common Energy Policy 
along national or intergovernmental lines and consist of member states such as Italy and 
Germany and their national energy companies but the group also consists of actors in the 
European Council and European Parliament. This group is further strengthened by a considerable 
share of the member states who are less vocal in the debate. 
Some politicians and scholars have argued that the dichotomy between supranational and 
intergovernmental constitutes a misrepresentation. In politics the German chancellor Angela 
Merkel has argued that the energy policy of the EU should be defined as a new Union method 
which is neither supranational nor is it intergovernmental but rather somewhere between these 
two levels of legislative competence. Braun acknowledged her definition in his article on energy 
competences under the Lisbon Treaty, arguing that while the EU is active in shaping the energy 
policies of the member states the national governments still retain essential rights.
65
 By adopting 
the Third Energy Package the member states and the EU have shown that they are able to shape 
Europe’s energy policy by close cooperation on sensitive subjects. However, analyzing the 
interests involved in the legislative decision-making process provides clear evidence of the 
underlying dichotomy between the European Commission and the national governments where 
the European Commission takes an assertive approach in influencing the development of a 
Common Energy Policy. The profound nature of this dichotomy is reinforced by the role of 
politics in the gas market because the European market is, in contrast to the USA,  influenced to 
a far greater extent by regulations and politics than by price. 
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Energy is a horizontal policy issue. In other words, energy is part of a multitude of policy 
fields: i.e. foreign policy, competition and environmental policy. Since the Lisbon Treaty, energy 
took on a more vertical policy structure with the creation of DG Energy. An individual DG 
inside the European Commission with a specific focus on energy. The effectiveness of this 
institutional change remains subject to debate.
66
 Nonetheless, it testifies to the process in which 
small steps are taken towards the development of a supranational institutional level for the 
development of a Common Energy Policy as seen in the development of the three legislative 
energy packages. 
 
3.1.2. Framework 
 
In 2010 Jerzy Buzek, in his role as President of the European Parliament, compared the 
development of a Common Energy Policy with the development of the ECSC, EURATOM and 
the Banking Union.
67
 Doing so implies that a Common Energy Policy will need an supranational 
institutional framework to function.  
While Tusk even proposed the creation of a supranational negotiating body that would 
overtake all future bilateral agreements with energy suppliers outside the Union, most actors in 
the debate do not tend to go that far.
68
 Three institutional changes will be discussed: (1) National 
Regulatory Authorities (NRAs), (2) the ability of the EU to speak with one voice, and (3) a 
mechanism to exchange information between the European Commission and the Member States 
on bilateral deals. 
(1) The creation of efficient NRA’s has been vital in the debate on what institutional 
conditions are necessary to develop a Common Energy Policy.
69
 However, the proposed 
solutions reveal the separation between two sides. The national regulators should remain under 
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national supervision or they should be reviewed, monitored and given a ‘community objective’.70 
Member states do acknowledge a role for the EU on the organization and monitoring of national 
regulators. Since the adaptation of the Third Energy Package the member states have, through 
their representative in the European Council, agreed on a guiding directive to synchronize their 
national regulators and to create them were none existed.  
(2) Since the adaptation of the Lisbon Treaty two positions have been created: the High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HR) and the President of 
the European Council.
71
 Both of which are meant to enable the EU to speak with a common 
voice increasing and thereby visualizing the supranational character of the EU. 
 (3) The European Commission proposed that a body to monitor developments in the 
energy market was necessary to safeguard future investments in the sector.
72
 In 2012 the 
European Parliament and the Council adopted the legislative decision to ‘establish an 
information exchange mechanism with regard to intergovernmental agreements between 
Member States and third countries in the field of energy’.73 The decision obliges the member 
states to inform the European Commission on all existing and future bilateral agreements with 
third parties in the field of energy. Thus information on bilateral agreements with Russia should 
be shared with the European Commission which in turn shares the information with all the 
member states while regarding commercially sensitive information. 
These three examples were initiated after the initiation of Nord Stream and at a time 
when the proposal for South Stream was relatively certain and are thus indicators that bilateral 
relations with Russia for the development of pipeline infrastructure have not prevented the 
adaptation of a multitude of supranational legislation for the development of the objectives of a 
Common Energy Policy: the internal market and the security of supply. 
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3.2. Third Energy Package 
 
The Third Energy Package, as a legislative package, is primarily concerned with the 
development of the internal market which is one of the objectives of a Common Energy Policy. 
Subordinate to this market orientated legislation are three other objectives defined in the 
Common Energy Policy. In particular the objective for the security of supply and to significant 
lesser degree the objectives of sustainability and the ability for the EU to speak with a single 
voice on the international stage.  Initiatives to pursue the latter three objectives is often done by 
identifying and integrating them with the objective of the creation of the internal market. The 
objective of the internal market unavoidably counters the existing market situation and these 
initiatives are thus likely to be considered controversial by existing market actors. 
 
3.2.1. Distribution of competences 
 
Member states enjoy exclusive competences in the Lisbon Treaty on the composition of 
their energy mix and in determining the sources of energy. Subsequently, actors in the 
commercial, political and academic field conclude that this has prevented the development of a 
Common Energy Policy thus far.
74
 I.e. Neuman notes that the EU articulates unclear strategies 
towards partners outside the EU in comparison to the Russia government which does not share 
these competences amongst different levels of government.
75
 However, a more nuanced 
approach reveals that the distribution of these competences is not as static as the Lisbon Treaty 
might suggest. Rather, it is subject to constant struggle and reinterpretation.  
Opposing supranational efforts are a multitude of national governments and the vested 
interests of energy companies operating within their respective national markets. The increased 
assertiveness of the European Commission was pronounced clearly after the proposal of the 
Third Energy Package. France, Germany and six other member states opposed the unbundling of 
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their energy structures by emphasizing the incompatibility with European law.
76
 Both Phillip 
Roesler, in his role as Germany’s Minister of Economy, and Angela Merkel, in her role as 
German Chancellor, warned that the EU was overstepping the mandate it was given.
77
 Merkel 
even pointed out the possibility of member states taking back competences from Brussels.  
Merkel was referring to the shift in competences towards the European Commission 
because the EU institution gained important informal competences in the field of energy. One 
example of informal competences is a poll that was initiated and coordinated by the European 
Commission itself. In this Eurobarometer, citizens of the EU were asked on which level they 
thought energy policy should best be legislated. The result confirmed their resolve when the 
largest share of respondents proposed that energy policy should be dealt with on a Union level.
78
 
Mayer mentions the shift in competences in his article by describing the process chronological as 
starting with informal rules and practices by the European Commission which were subsequently 
accepted as formal practices.
79
 A second method in which the European Commission gained 
more competences was through drawing secondary legislation.
80
 Using the right embedded in 
primary law to propose additional secondary legislation the European Commission drew 
directives and regulations which would limit the scope of the competences enjoyed by national 
governments.  
 
3.2.2. Shifting competences 
 
In the academic debate on energy policy some scholars try to determine how the 
European Commission was able to enjoy these competences in the field of energy. Natorski in 
his article in 2008, was in doubt if the successful shift in competences towards the European 
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Commission was due to efforts by the European Commission itself or should be considered a 
natural development.
81
 It is important to review how the European Commission managed to do 
so as this will provide clarity to the role of infrastructure for gas in the process. Moreover, by 
reviewing this gradual shift this research will provide a decisive answer to the question Natorski 
posed because the shift in competences was due to the assertiveness of the European 
Commission operating under favorable circumstances. This research will argue that the European 
Commission increased her influence in shaping a potential Common Energy Policy in three 
ways: (1) by cooperation, (2) by legislation, and (3) by indirect pressure.  
(1) Mayer argues that it is not a constant struggle between different levels of government 
but that the European Commission was using cooperation with the member states as a way to 
advance its own agenda.
82
 The member states needed the expertise and networking capabilities 
of the European Commission. In turn the European Commission portrayed itself as unbiased on a 
national level and thereby provided the possibility to build coalitions.  
(2) The European Commission used primary law extensively to expand her legislative 
power.
83
 The first example is the annual benchmarking reports provided by the European 
Commission. In this report the European Commission reviews the progress of the 
implementation of secondary legislation by the member states. The second example is the 
methods in which the Third Energy Package forces member states to provide information to the 
European Commission on all future bilateral deals with suppliers outside the EU.
84
 The final 
example is the use of different policy fields to influence the competences on energy.
85
 I.e. the use 
of competition law to remove the barriers to an internal energy market.
86
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(3) Eikeland provides us with valuable insight in the indirect pressure the European 
Commission uses to influence non-state actor.
87
 Under pressure from a high profile anti-trust 
investigation that was initiated by DG Competition against German E.ON. the energy company 
decided to adhere to the requirements of ownership unbundling. Consequently the European 
Commission ended the legal case that was opened before the European Court of Justice (ECJ). 
This form of indirect pressure is important because it realigns important incentives for member 
states to protect their own interests with those of the internal market of the EU. The European 
Commission managed to couple their demands for unbundling with their ability to initiate anti-
trust investigations.  
Nord Stream and South Stream testify for a shift towards supranational regulation as 
well. To date Nord Stream is not used to its full capacity of 55 bcm but instead it currently uses 
only half of that capacity. OPAL, one of the two main onshore extensions of Nord Stream is not 
used to full capacity because of legislation that would demand third party access. The project has 
not yet been granted permission by the European Commission for an exempted status. The 
existence of the possibility to uphold exemptions provides the EU with the ability to circumvent 
the limitations of the Third Energy Package in individual cases. In CEE countries, South Stream 
was developing to be the next cooperation between Gazprom and individual member states in 
constructing new transportation routes for Russian gas. Gazprom started the project with Italian 
Eni and successively concluded agreements with all the countries involved: Bulgaria, Serbia, 
Hungary, Greece, Slovenia, Austria and Croatia. In some cases, such as Bulgaria and Serbia, 
construction had started. To halt or delay this process the European Commission instigated 
investigations into those member states and concluded that South Stream violated the provisions 
in the Third Energy Package because it would oppose the rules on ownership unbundling and 
third party access. However, South Stream was under scrutiny before the violent tensions in 
Ukraine erupted but after the Russian presence in the Crimea the chances of South Stream being 
granted exempted status grew slimmer when Russia was faced with sanctions and increased 
opposition in Europe. Both cases illustrate that the European Commission enjoys sufficient 
competences to curb Russian influence in strategic infrastructure. Future decisions in the EU on 
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Nord Stream, the cancellation of South Stream and the outcome of the legal case against 
Gazprom will provide a more thorough picture on the role of the European Commission in 
implementing the provisions from the Third Energy Package. This is not to say that the Third 
Energy Package is an anti-Russian legislative package. The legislative package is foremost 
concerned with the development of the internal market. Provisions on unbundling and third party 
access would also apply to the development of TAP to transport Azerbaijani gas to the EU.  
However it does illustrate how legislation for the development of the internal market is used by 
policymakers to oppose Russian assertiveness in the operation of pipeline infrastructure for gas. 
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3.3. Security of supply 
 
The previous chapters examined which legislative measures the European Commission used to 
pursued a supranational Common Energy Policy and to develop different supranational 
mechanisms for promoting the internal market. This chapter determines how the topic of energy 
security, another objective of a Common Energy Policy, was used to create the favorable 
conditions for doing so. This examination is followed by an evaluation of the political stance of 
individual member states towards Russia and how this influences the perception of energy 
security. The economic interests of collaboration with Russia are interwoven with the political 
interests but will be discussed in chapter 4 on the Internal Market. 
 
3.3.1. Energy security 
 
Casier argued that Russia’s dominance was increasingly used by the European 
Commission as a reason for the member states to hand over competences to the Union.
88
 In 
doing so, Cassier followed Neuman who emphasized how politicians framed the topic of energy 
security. Neuman did so by citing Javier Solana, the former High Representative of Foreign and 
Security Policy.
 89
 Solana expressed his concern that Russia was more interested in exerting 
pressure on Europe than in facilitating increased production. An assertion that accused Russia of 
preferring political power over economic development. 
A multitude of causes helped the European Commission to use energy security as a raison 
d'être: (1) assertiveness on behalf of Russia in the development of the Southern Corridor with the 
initiation of South Stream; (2) the handling of price disputes by both Ukraine and Russia that 
limited the supply of gas; and (3) the growing prominence of the topic of energy security since 
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2000 as illustrated in figure 9.
90
 These are examples that provided additional favorable 
circumstances to the European Commission. In other words, the European Commission managed 
to shape the political agenda by tying the role of energy with foreign and security policy which 
followed popular tendency during that period. Natorski notes, the framing of energy security also 
backfired on the European Commission when the member states became more certain in their 
resolve to safeguard their exclusive competences in this policy area.
91
 
 
 
Kirchner argues that a Common Energy Policy does not exist because it lacks the same 
urgency that propelled previous institutional reforms.
92
 In his article, Inotai complements this 
argument. History teaches us, he argues, that the concept of a Common Energy Policy originated 
in subsequent external necessities. Starting with the ECSC, then EURATOM, following in 1973 
with the Oil Crisis and in the 1990’s re-emerging with the growing awareness of environmental 
circumstances.
93
 A strong influence on the future pleading of Tusk in comparing the 
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development of a Common Energy Policy with older supranational institutions. Natorski 
illustrates the same picture for the start of the twenty-first century. By quoting academics in the 
debate, he raises the possibility that changes in the world energy system provide a ‘window of 
opportunity’ to develop both the internal and external dimensions of a Common Energy Policy.94 
 In opposition to Natorski our common sense might argue that the EU already traded 
natural gas with Russia during the Cold War. Tensions that fueled the Cold War would have also 
provided the external necessity needed to develop a Common Energy Policy. Consequently, it 
might be argued that the argument of external necessity does not play the vital role that it is 
given in the debate. The article of Bilgin can be used to explain why this reasoning is wrong. 
Bilgin reviews the trade of natural gas with Russia during the decades of the Cold War.
95
 Despite 
the tensions the Soviet Union had a reputation of being a reliable supplier. This reputation was a 
consequence of Russia’s uninterrupted supply of natural gas to Europe. Further confirmation of 
this trust is provided by the exponential growth in gas imports from Russia between 1967 and 
1995. Even during the beginning of the new millennium, member states in Western Europe 
emphasized that Russia was a more reliable supplier than suppliers located in the Middle East, 
Latin America and Africa.
96
 
 
3.3.2. Pipelines and perception 
 
Amounting tensions and violence in the Ukraine for the past couple of years could provide 
another external necessity for the EU. It is reasonable to assume that energy disputes and 
political tensions between Ukraine and Russia have intensified the calls for a Common Energy 
Policy.
97
 However, a more detailed review on the level of national governments proves that this 
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growing awareness of threats to the security of supply are perceived with different urgency 
throughout the EU.  
In the political sphere Russia provided external necessity for proponents of a Common 
Energy Policy. However it did not provide this necessity for all actors involved. One important 
reason for this is the different perception of Russia amongst the member states.  The perception 
of Russia within the EU has become the subject of a multitude of scientific articles.
98
  
Estonia, Lithuania and Poland are the most vocal in expressing their concerns on the 
threats to the security of supply by trading natural gas with Russia.
99
 Bulgaria, Hungary, Austria 
were among the member states who were most affected by previous disruptions.
100
 However, 
they did not express the same level of concern and even collaborated with Russia in the 
development of South Stream. Germany and Italy do not express the same urgency because they 
have relatively good relations with Russia and because they are protected by a diversified 
market.
101
 Furthermore, producing member states like the Netherlands and the United Kingdom 
are more concerned with the necessity created by their depleting domestic production and the 
subsequent development of their strategic position as hubs in the trade of gas. 
 For parties involved in the joint ventures of Nord Stream and South Stream bilateral 
cooperation created ‘rapprochement through interdependence’. 102  Constructing these projects 
thus decreased a sense of urgency amongst the participants. This research argues that Nord 
Stream has increased the security of supply even if this was achieved at the expensive of the 
strategic position of Ukraine. Statistics on the usage of pipelines substantiate this argument. 
Before the construction of Nord Stream 80 percent of all gas was transported through Ukraine 
but ever since Nord Stream became operational this number has decreased to 50 percent in 
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2012.
103
 It is reasonable to assume that the volume transported through the Soyuz pipelines 
would have continued to fall in the future if the development of South Stream was completed. 
Member states in South Eastern Europe supported the pipeline project in cooperation with 
Russia’s Gazprom although most of them did not agree with Russia’s policy towards Ukraine. 
Regarding Ukraine, Russia is thought to provide the external necessity for a supranational 
Common Energy Policy. However this urgency is limited due to the dwindling sense of urgency 
with the alternative that was offered by Nord Stream and South Stream whereby future gas 
disruptions will have only limited consequences for the EU. A stress test initiated by the 
European Commission in 2014 confirmed that potential future disruptions would have a smaller 
effect on the availability of gas throughout the EU and in particular the vulnerable member states 
in South Eastern Europe.
104
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4. Internal market 
 
In developing pipeline infrastructure for the transport of Russian gas political action often 
follows trade. Consequently, the energy companies cooperating with Russia have a significant 
impact on the energy policy of their respective governments. This chapter will examine the role 
of pipeline infrastructure for transportation of Russian gas in developing the internal market by 
examining three successive  perspectives: (1) energy companies, (2) national interests and (3) 
prices. 
4.1. Energy companies 
 
4.1.1. National champion 
 
 ‘National champion’ is a term applied to energy companies that do not solely seek to increase 
profit but who also seek to consolidate and advance the domestic interests of their host country. 
This is caused by the fact that energy is a commodity that besides economical use also entails 
great strategic and political consequences. These companies cooperate in joint ventures where 
two or more companies agree to pool their resources for a specific project. In this research a 
good example would be a joint venture for the development of a pipeline for natural gas.  
 National champions often have a strong domestic base where they enjoy the 
support of their respective national government. Because of their unique position as a natural 
monopoly they can prevent competition in their respective market. In academic and political 
literature on the subject the reasoning behind this argument is manifold: (1) there is a lack of 
competition because a small number of companies have a monopoly or oligarchy;
105
 (2) there is 
a lack of incentive to innovate;
106
 (3) new companies cannot compete with existing national 
champions because they lack access to infrastructure and information;
107
 (4) governments control 
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these national champions by regulations and state aid;
108
 and (5) as a consequence bilateral deals 
are closed with suppliers outside the EU without regard of the interests of other member 
states.
109
. It is therefore that national champions are often viewed in opposition to liberalization.  
The German energy companies RWE and E.ON, Italian energy company Eni and the 
French energy company GDF Suez expressed strong opposition towards legislation in the Third 
Energy Package that would oblige them to unbundle their infrastructural assets from the 
production of gas. 
Noël reminds us that the reasoning behind this criticism was not so common two decades 
ago.
110
 National champions and the bilateral deals of their respective governments with Russia 
were seen as a pragmatic solution that logically followed the characteristics of the market for 
gas. These companies were referred to as natural monopolies which entails that the structure of 
this market made a monopoly the most efficient and thus economical way of structuring the 
market due to high costs and high risks involved in the energy sector. A market that requires 
considerable investments upfront and a market that is in need of government support. It was 
considered common sense that national champions were better able to manage the risks of 
trading natural gas than segmenting the market and promoting competition.  
   
4.1.2. Gazprom 
 
Gazprom originated out of the Soviet Ministry of Gaz in the Soviet Union which existed until 
1989 when it was reorganized into a corporation. When Vladimir Putin came to govern Russia in 
2000 he was promoting the development of Gazprom as a national champion. Russia is not a part 
of the WTO and did not sign any other international economic agreement.
111
 This enabled Russia 
to assimilate the economic goals of Gazprom with the political and strategic goals of the state 
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without being hindered by agreements which would limit these efforts. A decade later, Gazprom 
still controlled 80 percent of Russia’s total production and possessed the sole monopoly on the 
export of natural gas.
112
  
Proponents of a Common Energy Policy on supranational level are worried about 
Gazprom acquiring European energy infrastructure. Gazprom holds a 50 percent stake in the 
trading hub in Baumgarten, Austria and tried to acquire the infrastructure for the transit of 
natural gas through Ukraine. Furthermore, Gazprom owns the largest share of facilities in the EU 
for the storage of gas. For those who are skeptical of Russia this entails the threat that Gazprom 
could use these assets to influence customers, defy competition and subsequently opposing the 
two main objectives of a Common Energy Policy with regard to the functioning of the internal 
market and the security of supply 
Moreover, in 2014 Gazprom was in collaboration with nearly 20 energy companies in 
Europe.
113
 The modus operandi in all these collaborations is by joint venture or bilateral relations 
with their respective governments. Out of all these collaborations the cooperation with national 
champions in Italy and Germany are considered the most important for Gazprom.
114
 Italy and 
Germany import the largest volumes and yield the largest profits. In disregard of the political 
implications of these collaborations it should not be underestimated to what extent Gazprom is 
driven by the same pragmatism as European energy companies by prioritizing cooperation with 
Germany, in Nord Stream, and with Italy, on South Stream. Thereby scaling down transit of gas 
through and trade of gas with eastern Europe. As is emphasized by the observation of Aalto 
when he notes that member states and companies who were strongly opposed to the concept of 
ownership unbundling did not challenge this mechanism when it was applied to Gazprom when 
the European Commission initiated an anti-trust inquiry into Gazprom in 2012 for possible anti-
competitive behavior.
115
  
 
                                                 
112
 Ziegler, C. E. (2013). Energy Pipeline Networks, 13. 
113
 Idem, 13. 
114
 Noël, P. (2009). A Market between us, 14. 
115
 Aalto, P. (2014). European Energy Security, 766 – 767. 
47 
 
4.2. National interest 
 
Divided national interests are often used as an argument in itself.
116
 However, national interests 
and commercial interests overlap. Abdelal formulated this relationship in his conclusion: 
“Although these business decisions were cold, calculating, and profit motivated, the executives 
who made them relied on history, politics, and trust to do so”.117 The validity of this formulation 
took questionable forms when Gerard Schröder in his position as the former Chancellor of 
Germany became head of the shareholders committee of Nord Stream after his government had 
provided a guarantee to cover a controversial loan for Nord Stream in the case that Gazprom 
would default. Moreover, Gazprom offered the Italian Prime Minister Romani Prodi the position 
of Chairman of South Stream after leaving office but, unlike Schröder, Prodi declined. 
 
4.2.1. Liberalization 
 
Pollitt examined the arguments for and against ownership unbundling by examining other the 
countries where this measure was already implemented.
118
 He concluded that in all these cases 
ownership unbundling was successful in improving competition in their respective markets but 
was careful with the causation of his findings because it could well be that these markets were 
set to profit the most from liberalization thus being motivated to implement ownership 
unbundling in the first place. The research also covered ownership unbundling in the Netherlands 
and the United Kingdom which already implemented the measures before the adaptation of 
legislation in the Third Energy Package. Their success reinforced the efforts of the European 
Commission to include ownership unbundling in the legislative packages.  
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When the legislation for liberalization through ownership unbundling was proposed the 
national governments were divided within the EU. Led by the national governments of Germany 
and France the proposal was criticized by six more member states: Austria, Bulgaria, Latvia, 
Luxembourg, Slovakia, and Greece. For Germany and France the opposition to the proposal for 
liberalization coincided with the opposition from their respective national champions which were 
supported in their efforts by the Italian energy company Eni.
119
 
By acknowledging the shift in competences towards the European Commission this research 
downplayed the validity of the argument that the European Commission is lacking the 
competences to develop a Common Energy Policy. Nonetheless, as with the adaptation of the 
Third Energy Package the European Commission needs to find compromises with the respective 
member states in the EU.  
The competences of the European Commission should not be overstated which is illustrated 
by the problematic implementation of legislation from the Third Energy Package. Nowak and 
Afifi have emphasized that the problematic implementation of the provisions from the Third 
Energy Package have hindered the development of a Common Energy Policy.
120
 These problems 
are illustrated by the number of infringement cases initiated against the member states. By 2007 
the European Commission had opened a total of 34 infringement procedures against 20 member 
states. The main issues in the transposition of the Directives under the Second Energy Package 
were concerned with: insufficient unbundling, regulated prices and favored access to incumbents 
for long-term contracts (LTCs).
121
   The legal procedures were initiated because the member 
states did not transpose the legislation at all or they did not implement the legislation as they 
were obliged to do. Problems with implementation were not limited to the Second Energy 
Package but they continued with the problematic implementation of the Third Energy Package. 
Reviewing this, highlights the persistency and pragmatism in which national interests are 
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safeguarded. While the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden implemented 
the legislation before it took effect, Germany and France were resisting proper 
implementation.
122
 
 
4.2.2. Pipelines 
 
 
Energy companies participating in pipeline projects
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Figure 10. Energy companies participating in pipeline projects. 
 
Russia prefers to structure the export of natural gas using bilateral deals with individual member 
states. Umbach argues that Russia prefers bilateral deals because it provides her with the ability 
to ‘Divide and Rule!’.125 However, this modes operandi is not to the sole benefit of Russia nor 
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does Russia have a monopoly on the concept of bilateral agreements. Member states such as 
Germany and France prefer bilateral agreements with Russia over a supranational approach. This 
is a pragmatic choice since they stand to benefit most from these direct relations with Russia. 
This does not imply that these bilateral relations or infrastructural projects by definition oppose 
efforts for liberalization. Nord Stream and South Stream are the most controversial examples of 
bilateral relations with Russia. Therefore it is useful to examine the winners and losers  in both 
projects to explain the policy choices of the national governments in the EU towards a Common 
Energy Policy and liberalization.  
Nord Stream was initiated by the energy companies Gazprom, E.ON and Wintershall. 
Subsequently Gasunie and GDF joined the project thereafter.  The pipeline infrastructure for 
Russian gas enjoyed the full support of their respective governments because it would enable 
these countries to bypass the traditional transit countries which would improve the security of 
supply and reduce additional transit costs. The United Kingdom was openly suggesting that Nord 
Stream could be extended to their domestic market as well.
126
 Poland, Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania comprised the most vocal opponents of the project. The Polish opposition to the 
construction of Nord Stream is often used as the prime example of the divisive nature of bilateral 
collaboration with Russia.
127
 As Germany and Russia agreed on developing the new project 
Polish politicians were quick to express their strong opposition. The subsequent comparison to 
German politics during the Second World War was able to count on a receptive audience and 
was cited numerous times in both the public and academic debate to emphasize the divisive 
consequences of Nord Stream.  These concerns voiced by the traditional transit country is not 
unfounded but it should be put in perspective. Formally this opposition was grounded in 
concerns for the environmental and political consequences. I.e.: Russia would be able to cut off 
supplies to Poland because Nord Stream would provide an alternative route to Western 
Europe.
128
 However, following the argumentation of this research we have reasonably 
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determined that Nord Stream does not increase the dependency on Russia and the rhetoric on 
security of supply is often framed to advance the position of the actor that proclaims this threat. 
Therefore it is reasonable that some academic authors have questioned motives of the Polish 
opposition by pointing to the loss in volume for the Yamal pipeline, subsequent transit fees and 
the loss in political leverage against Russia.
129
 
South Stream was  initiated by Gazprom and Eni to circumvent the traditional transit 
countries as well. The route of the project was later changed to enter the EU in Bulgaria. The 
pipeline would then be constructed through Serbia, Hungary and Austria without requiring these 
countries to make considerable investments that would usually accompany this expensive 
project. The pragmatism that accompanies these collaboration is illustrated by the fact that 
Austria, Bulgaria and Hungary supported both Nabucco and South Stream while these projects 
are examples of the political tensions between the EU and Russia. When South Stream was 
cancelled in 2014 it was not only the participants of the project that were affected but also the 
two most important objectives of a Common Energy Policy: development of the internal market 
and security of supply. The participating countries would lose both the transit revenues and the 
alternative transport route for Russian gas. Moreover, they would lose the opportunity to 
improve their strategic location in Europe and they now had to continue to rely on Ukraine as the 
main transit country for the importation of Russian gas.  Besides that, Italy and Austria lost the 
opportunity to become strategic hubs for the trade and transport of gas in Central and South 
Eastern Europe. Consequently, Ukraine and Slovakia became the main beneficiaries of the 
cancellation of the project by safeguarding their strategic position as traditional transit countries.  
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4.3. Prices 
 
4.3.1. Energy weapon 
 
 The role of prices lacks hard data because data on the price of natural gas is considered 
confidential by both Gazprom and its clients. When using the available data on the prices of 
Russian gas profound differences are revealed. These differences between member states can 
roughly be categorized by their geographical and historical proximity to Russia. For 2006 it is 
estimated that Germany paid roughly 250 EUR per thousand cubic meters (tcm) while Poland 
paid around 150 EUR and the Baltic countries between 105 - 140 EUR.
130
  
 Yet the member states that paid considerably less for natural gas in 2006 were often also 
the member states that had the worst relation with Russia. A reason for this is the suspicion that 
Russia uses the leverage on these countries to influence their national policies. Thus the price of 
gas can change according to the disposition of a member state towards Russia.
131
 In recent years 
this was illustrated in Ukraine where the new government with a favorable stance towards Russia 
received significant discounts on the price of gas. When this government was replaced by a new 
government who positioned itself towards the EU the discount was withdrawn.
132
  
Aalto mentioned that Russia was using the trade in natural gas for political goals in more 
than 30 instances between 2000 and 2010.
133
 Ziegler also argued that Russia and Gazprom have 
used political leverage to influence national policies in Eastern Europe.
134
 While this might be 
true it provides partial representation of pipeline politics. Postolachi reminds the reader that the 
energy disputes in 2006 and 2009 were initiated by Ukraine when the national government tried 
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to renegotiate prices by making use of its vital position as the most important transit country.
135
 
More importantly however, is the argument of Stegen Smith that was mentioned in the chapter 
on political arguments. She rightfully emphasized that Russia’s use of gas as a political weapon 
had eventually backfired on Russia in a multitude of instances.
136
 Thus we can conclude that 
Gazprom’s influence on gas prices does not prevent the development of a Common Energy 
Policy but rather it promotes popular resentment towards Russia. The disputes on prices caused 
this resentment as a side effect rather as its aim due to pragmatic economic motives.  
Russian renegotiations of gas prices throughout Europe was a reactive policy and 
coincided with renegotiations on gas prices with Norway and Algeria originating from changes 
in the supply and demand on the world market. The reverse policy can be witnessed in Eastern 
Europe where countries were obliged to pay increasingly more for Russian gas in the last decade. 
However the increase in price for member states in Eastern Europe should be viewed as an 
inevitable economic reaction to historical low prices following the subsidizing of these countries 
under the former Soviet Union.
137
 
 
4.3.2. LTC and spot market 
 
Russia’s influence on blocking future integration of the European energy market is limited by the 
changing dynamics of the energy market in Western Europe because the prices are not only 
determined through (1) long-term contracts (LTCs) that work on a take-or-pay basis but also by 
(2) gas-on-gas competition in spot markets.  
 (1) To date the vast majority of gas trade is structured through long-term contracts which 
tend to follow the volatility of the oil price.
138
 The provisions of LTCs ensure that Russia as a 
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supplier sells a minimum amount of gas even if the gas is not used. Furthermore the prices 
include regulations that prohibited the importer of Russian gas from reselling it to other member 
states. These contracts are not characteristic for Russia but the contracts are common in the trade 
of natural gas amongst other exporting countries such as The Netherlands, Norway and 
Algeria.
139
 Nowak mentions how these bilateral obligations divided member states and disrupted 
competition.
140
 Providing the foundation for one of the main arguments used by former Polish 
Prime Minister Tusk to call for a negotiating body on a supranational level because this would 
enable the EU to acquire information on bilateral deals and their corresponding prices at pace 
with the position of Gazprom.
141
  
(2) However, in Western Europe this structure for trading has begun to change. Most 
notably in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands where spot markets have gained a foothold. 
Spot markets are marketplaces located on virtual or physical hubs that enable market participants 
to trade gas. These spot markets adhere to a short-term structure where Russian gas has to 
compete with LNG imports and thereby increasing competition.
142
 As a consequence of 
competition of gas traded in these hubs there is a high price transparency and limited transactions 
costs in comparison with LTC. As a result of market integration the prices of pipeline gas and 
LNG have converged in the past decade. In the quarterly review of the gas market the European 
Commission  emphasized the success of gas-on-gas competition. The European Commission 
argued that increased competition on spot markets in Western Europe influenced the price of gas 
traded in Eastern Europe.
143
 However, the price of 43% of all gas traded in the EU is still based 
on the indexation of the oil prices.
144
 The fact that these changes occurred in countries who both 
participated in Nord Stream and supported ownership unbundling testifies how bilateral relations 
can become part of the  competition in the internal market. This is not to say the spot markets are 
always more profitable than LTC for those in demand of gas. The prices on spot markets are 
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more volatile and more dependent on the price of gas and alternative energy commodities on the 
global market whilst the price agreed upon in LTC is more stable and less affected by the 
changes in supply and demand of energy. 
 
4.3.3. Energy market 
 
Following the argumentation in the previous chapter, the changes in supply and demand on the 
world market influenced the interests of national champions. Before it was argued that national 
champions that collaborate with Russia stand to benefit more from a fragmented market than a 
single competitive market. While it is unreasonable to neglect the validity of this argumentation 
it needs to be qualified. Noël argues that energy companies increasingly shift their support 
towards a single European market for energy because they want to be able to trade gas from west 
to east when future disruptions occur and to profit from price developments on the global 
market. 145  Furthermore, these energy companies are increasingly pressured to change their 
modus operandi in the trade of gas. Goldthau acknowledges this when he argues that changing 
dynamics of prices threaten to put domestic energy companies out of business.146 This has led 
Dreyer to compare the market for gas to the more competitive markets of oil and coal where 
Russia is not able to dominate.147 Aalto even argues that the competition from LNG provides the 
European Commission with the renewed possibility to “break the national champions’ anti-
competitive positions”.148 Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that national champions promote 
the national interests of their host country but the means to do so have increasingly come into 
line with the objective of creating an internal market in the EU. Gazprom, among many others, 
prefers LTCs with European national champions and hinders competition on the internal market. 
However, changing global circumstances provide a significant counterweight to traditional 
market structure in the EU.  
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Conclusion 
 
Developing the internal market is the most important objective of the Third Energy 
Package and a Common Energy Policy. In order to create a competitive internal market it is 
necessary to improve the integration of the European energy grid.  The construction of LNG-
terminals, pipelines and interconnectors with reverse-flow capabilities are the appointed 
infrastructure for achieving these objectives. Since the adaptation of the Third Energy Package 
the construction of this infrastructure has increased significantly and the subsequent operation of 
this infrastructure has changed the traditional flow of gas in the EU. The new entry point into 
Germany provided by Nord Stream diversified the infrastructure for the trade of gas with Russia. 
Nord Stream used the increased connectivity of the energy grid to distribute Russian gas in 
opposite direction to the traditional flow of gas. It is reasonable to assume that the construction 
of South Stream would have entailed the same development of the internal market and the 
security of supply if the project had been constructed. 
Diversification of the pipeline infrastructure for trading gas with Russia does not increase 
the diversification of sources, which could threaten the security of supply. However, since the 
operation of Nord Stream both the volume and the share of Russian gas imported into the EU has 
decreased. While domestic production is dwindling and will do so in the future, the import of gas 
from Russia was limited through increased efficiency, alternative sources of energy and a 
negative perception of Russia. Additionally, it is questionable if Russia would be able to increase 
the volume of gas exported to the EU considering the lack of investments and the depletion of 
gas fields currently in operation. In disregard of Nord Stream the diversification of sources for 
the import of gas has increased since 2006. Consequently, Nord Stream has not increased the 
dependency on Russian gas and there is no compelling reason to assume this would be any 
different for South Stream. 
The debate on the development of a Common Energy Policy is defined as a struggle 
between two levels of governance: supranational versus intergovernmental.  This research 
concludes that the European Commission has been able to initiate a supranational character to 
the development of a Common Energy Policy through the proposal of new legislation. This is 
shown through the monitoring of national regulators, the creation of two influential positions 
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under the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of a mechanism for the exchange of information 
on bilateral agreements. 
While the distribution of competences is recorded in the Treaty of Lisbon the practical 
interpretation of these competences has not been static.  The European Commission was able to 
create and shift legislative competences towards a supranational level by cooperation with 
member states, initiating secondary legislation that provided rules and boundaries for primary 
legislation and by pressuring market actors indirectly. The European Commission managed to do 
so by using and creating the favorable circumstances in which these changes would be 
acceptable. Nord Stream and South Stream illustrate the supranational competences of the 
European Commission by blocking Gazprom from using the full capacity of these pipelines. This 
does not mean the Third Energy Package is designed in opposition to Russia. However it does 
illustrate that legislation for the development of the internal market is used by policymakers to 
oppose Russian assertiveness in the operation of pipeline infrastructure. 
The perception of Russia providing a threat to the security of supply was unprecedented 
in the historic gas trade with Europe. The topic of energy security gained public awareness in the 
new millennium and the European Commission used this to create a sense of urgency.  This 
sense of urgency was not shared by most of the national governments who were primarily 
concerned with the urgencies provided by their national interests. This pragmatic stance of the 
member states led to collaboration with Russia in Nord Stream and South Stream. Nord Stream 
has proven to increase the security of supply by diminishing the strategic position of Ukraine as 
traditional transit country and it is justified to assume the same for South Stream. 
National champions and the bilateral deals of their respective governments with Russia 
were initiated as a pragmatic structure that logically followed the characteristics of the market for 
gas. It was considered common sense that national champions were more suitable to manage the 
risks of trading natural gas rather than segmenting the market and promoting competition. It 
should not be underestimated to what extent Gazprom is driven by the same pragmatism in 
prioritizing cooperation with Germany in Nord Stream and with Italy in South Stream, 
consequently scaling down the importance of relationships with member states in Eastern 
Europe. 
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While commercial interests often initiate the development of energy policy they need 
political cooperation to be able to operate most efficiently.  Liberalization of the existing market 
structure led to opposition from national champions and their respective governments. While 
compromises were made to adapt legislation for the unbundling of the ownership of 
infrastructure the subsequent implementation proved problematic. Initial opponents of 
liberalization resisted proper implementation of the legislation which led to the opening of legal 
cases by the European Commission. For those skeptical of Russian dependence, Nord Stream 
provided a good example of the divisive consequences of European collaboration with Gazprom. 
However, it is reasonable to explain this emphasis on energy security as market pragmatism, 
whereas Nord Stream created profit for Germany it incurred financial losses for Poland. 
When on December 1, 2014 Vladimir Putin announced the cancellation of South Stream 
this was not only affecting the member states participating in the project but also the objectives 
of a Common Energy Policy: development of the internal market and security of supply. Italy 
and Austria lost an opportunity to become strategic hubs for the trade and transport of gas. 
Bulgaria, Hungary, Serbia and Slovakia lost transit revenues, political leverage and an alternative 
to unreliable transportation of gas through Ukraine.  
This research does not determine if Russia was using gas as a political weapon because in 
disregard to the significance of this assertion the disruptions of gas damaged the reputation of 
Russia as a reliable supplier and the reputation of Ukraine as a reliable transit country. In other 
words, even if Russia used gas as a political weapon with the purpose of influencing national 
governments it eventually did not hinder the objectives of a Common Energy Policy. The supply 
of Russian gas is subordinated to the volatile supply and demand on the global market which is 
illustrated by revision of contracts and prices with member states throughout the EU. While 
LTCs and the indexation of gas prices to the price of oil remain the modus operandi for a 
significant share of the market, the emerging of spot markets and gas-on-gas competition 
influences the traditional trade and pricing of gas. These markets are concentrated in the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands but subsequent price signals are received throughout Europe. Both 
member states were eager to collaborate in Nord Stream and argued for ownership unbundling 
which testifies how new infrastructure for the trade of Russian gas can participate in gas-on-gas 
competition in the internal market. 
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